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1
The transformation of a former socialist economy requires a complete reorganization of enter-
prises and restructuring of institutional frameworks. This type of economy has been character-
ized inter alia by
dominance of large, state-owned conglomerates and companies,
absence of competition and, hence, a low rate of market-exit and -entry,
poor market orientation (especially with respect to foreign markets),
technological backwardness,
deficiencies in corporate behaviour as with, respect to improving efficiency, risk taking
and profit orientation.
In a socialist economy loss making companies were able to survive. In a western-style market
economy, however, unprofitable firms either have to adjust themselves to become profitable -
or they have to die.
In a transforming economy there is a common legacy of most companies: low competitiveness
as the result of obsolete capital stock and overmanning, insufficient product qualities not satis-
fying demand, inadequate management capacities, distorted specialization patterns and trade
orientation towards the former COMECON, high and partly ill-designed vertical and horizontal
integration, suboptimal size of conglomerates and companies. As it was pointed out by Hax
(1992) the socialist economy did not know "enterprises" in the usual sense - which means
autonomous economic units subject to a hard budget constraint and operating in a competitive
environment. Rather the conglomerates and their subunits were bureaucratic organizations in a
hierarchically structured and centrally commanded system of production. The task is to convert
such bureaucratic units into viable, competitive enterprises.
The paper focuses on the microeconomic effects of changes in ownership structure and enter-
prise behaviour in the transition process. There are good reasons to argue that the recovery of a
former socialist economy is unlikely to happen without reorganization and privatization of the
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the ACE-Workshop "Entrepreneurial
Possibilities Developing in Central East European Countries and the Enactment of Their
Economic Reforms" held on 10-14 September 1992 in Balatonalmadi. The author wishes
to thank the participants of the workshop and, above all, his colleague Birgit Sander for
helpful suggestions.large state-owned companies. Private property is the core of a market economy. A mainly pri-
vate market economy provides at best what ailing state-owned companies need: promising con-
cepts, market-oriented management and fresh money (Steinherr, Perre'e, 1992).
I Restructuring under State and Private Ownership: The Theoretical Back-
ground
The overwhelming majority of economists and policy makers agree that private ownership is
important for transforming a socialist economy - but there is no consensus on how important it
is. The discussion on privatization in western market economies has come to the conclusion
that other factors are even more important, especially the pressure exerted by competitive mar-
kets and a hard budget constraint. As shown by Vickers and Yarrow (1988), the performance of
an enterprise depends not just on ownership but on the economic environment in which it op-
erates. On the other hand, only private ownership provides the incentives necessary to make
former socialist firms able to meet the requirements of the market.
A strategy of reorganizing and restructuring a former socialist economy on the micro sphere has
to start with designing new economic units - and privatization is a strong, lever to do this. The
typical socialist company has been a conglomerate of dependent factories with a wide range of
production lines often locally far distributed, and it is just impossible to give it simply into pri-
vate ownership. Therefore, it has to be broken up into a number of independent units. A com-
petitive economy is characterized by a mix of (few) large and (many) medium and small sized
producers. Without splitting and regrouping former socialist conglomerates cannot be privatized
efficiently.
A newly designed enterprise should be privatized as quickly as possible. From experiences in
western market economies we learn that the state is a weak owner. He is often subject to politi-
cal pressures - on part of central and local governments, on part of trade unions or on part of
political parties - which make for suboptimal efficiency levels: there is always a minister,
mayor or union leader who opposes against firing workers or closing down a production line.
With state ownership the principal-agent problem can hardly be solved (Fink, Schediwy, 1992).
However, splitting up a large state-owned company is not easy. The Privatization Agency is
generally meeting with strong resistance on part of both the management and the workforce.
The Agency can often sell only the profitable parts and is forced to close the others. Further-
more, for a loss-making large state-owned company it is much easier to receive subsidies than
for a small- or medium-sized firm.
Privatization provides the best way to reorganize a state-owned enterprise and not vice versa.
Such an enterprise urgently needs a new entrepreneurial concept which promises profits. Cer-tainly, an entrepreneurial concept cannot simply be attained by privatization. But it can be ex-
pected that a private investor is better qualified to identify and to realize profitable business op-
portunities than any state agency. This task requires talented and experienced managers who are
usually not greedy to join a state company. Management capacities are a scarce resource in the
market economy and they are even more scarce in a former socialist economy striving for mar-
ketization.
The key for reorganizing and restructuring a former socialist company is financial resources.
For such a company which is often facing an uncertain future it is not easy or even impossible
to obtain financing on the capital market. Consequently, its investment expenditures have to be
sourced out of public funds - and the risk of failures is immense when public financing is at
stake. A privatized enterprise, on the other hand, has its own capital at risk, with no chance of
government bail out. Its lending activities are undertaken strictly according to tough
credit-worthy criteria. Insofar, quick privatization is also the best way to separate viable and
non-viable firms. A private investor risks losing his money, thus he will take his decisions very
deliberately. One can conclude that a firm which cannot find a bidder has no chance to survive
and should be closed down.
To summarize: the task for firms in a transforming economy is to achieve long-run economic
performance or - referring to a concept of Douglass C. North (1992) - to reach adaptive effi-
ciency. In contrast to allocative efficiency it is a dynamic concept which is concerned "with the
willingness ... to acquire knowledge and learning to induce innovation, to undertake risk and
creative activity of all sorts, as well as to resolve problems and bottlenecks ... through time"
(p. 3). Introducing private ownership is presumably the best way to create adaptively efficient
firms.
II Enterprise Performance and Ownership Structure: The Findings
1. The Data Base
The paper examines the effects of privatization on reorganization and restructuring of compa-
nies in Eastern Germany. Up to the end of July 1992 the Treuhandanstalt (the agency in charge
of privatization) had completely or overwhelmingly privatized a total of about 5800 companies
but still had another 4000 companies to privatize (Table 1). The core question is: how has eco-
nomic performance developed with regard to those companies that have been privatized in con-
trast to those that have remained in Treuhand ownership? The hypothesis is that the situation of
-privatized companies has rather improved than worsened while for Treuhand companies the
contrary is true.Table 1 - State of Privatization in Eastern Germany (State: End of August 1992)
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Several reasons call for focusing on the impact of ownership changes in the so-called industrial
area:
More than others (except agriculture) this sector is under severe pressure. It has lost most
of its previous markets - thus production has come down to two thirds of its previous
level and is now stagnating (Graph 1). The majority of firms (still) suffers from low
competitiveness: turnover per employee (as a rough performance indicator) reaches only
about one third of the level in the West German industry.
In this sector privatization is lagging behind. While in other branches like retail trade,
hotels, restaurants or pharmacies most entities have been sold off quickly, a great number
of industrial enterprises is still completely or partly in state ownership.
For this sector data are somewhat better than for other sectors. The information available
allows to evaluate the present performance of companies, the problems they are currently
facing, the short and medium term expectations and the design of restructuring programs.
It goes without saying that data do not meet the requirements for careful investigations.
Data used in this paper mainly come from polls of several German Research Institutes, espe-
cially from the Deutsches Institut fiir Wirtschaftsforschung Berlin (DIW) and the Institut fiir
Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH). They were collected at different times and published in dif-
ferent series. The underlying samples of enterprises are varying widely; hence the quality of in-7
formation is difficult to evaluate. Despite these insufficiencies, these poll-data are the only ones
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Nevertheless, further caveats are necessary. Above all, data can be biased in three ways:
Possibly, poll samples are not fully representative. They can be biased towards large and
old state-owned enterprises (both privatized and still in the ownership of the Treuhand-
anstalt) and biased against small- and medium-sized private firms just built-up from
scratch. Newly established firms are presumably performing better than the old ones.Probably not all of the interviewed enterprises asses their current situation and future
prospects as realistic. Especially the Treuhand-enterprises tend to overrate themselves.
Necessarily, there is a strong selection in the privatization process. This causes a positive
correlation between the (future) competitiveness of enterprises and their privatization
chances. Enterprises already privatized are bearing the quality label ("Gutesiegel") of
being chosen by risk-sensitive private investors. Hence, it is of no surprise that with on-
going privatization the non-privatized enterprises are becoming less competitive on the
average.
With a few exemptions no differentiation between types of companies in private ownership is
possible. One can assume that the situation of private companies newly founded is much better
than the situation of companies newly privatized. (Information on the ownership structure in
Eastern German manufacturing is given in the appendix).
2. Current State of Affairs
In summer 1990, when the German Economic, Monetary and Social Union (GEMSU) was
started, everybody became aware that the Eastern German industry was facing severe trouble.
One year later, in summer 1991, the deplorable state became manifest. According to a represen-
tative poll among roughly 1 500 large firms - initially or still in the ownership of the Treuhand-
anstalt - only 10 p.c. considered themselves as competitive at that time (Graph 2).
The causes the companies identified for the desolate state varied, however, the majority re-
ported the same problems. In detail they complained about
too low sales
too large and obsolete production capacities
too large labour force
too little funds for investment
too fast wage increase.
In some cases answers were obviously inconsistent. While 70 p.c. of companies were complain-
ing about difficulties in finding customers for their products and in getting access to trade dis-
tribution networks, only a small fraction of companies doubted the quality of their goods and
services. Poor product quality, however, was one of the salient and most negative features of
the socialist economies and their opening up induced massive substitution of domestically pro-
duced goods for (western) foreign goods: Eastern German producers did not only lose most oftheir markets for cars, electronics, opticals, products of mechanical engineering and other so-
phisticated products but also for clothing, furniture and even for foodstuff.
Graph 2
Self Assessment of Competitiveness by Eastern German
Industrial Enterprises in Summer 1991
Pc. of enterprises take themselves for competitive
DID within half a year dJ in an indefinite period
I •: I within one year JvTJ never
El within two years ^3 no assessment possible
dD in more than two years 19 at present full competitive
Source: Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung. Berlin.
However strong or weak the companies may have been - they obviously also had a lot of illu-
sions about their future prospects. The majority of them considered it to be sufficient to mod-
ernize plants, to improve marketing and, above all, to reduce labour force. Therefore, many
companies favoured a defensive strategy of cost reduction and neglected innovative strategies10
such as developing new products. According to the 1991 poll roughly 50 p.c. of enterprises
were planning investment in new capacities, 40 p.c. sales activitie> and 30 p.c. staff cuts. Less
than 10 p.c. considered the development of new products, the improvement of product quality
and/or the reduction of product prices as urgent.
The overly optimistic expectations of companies were also reflected by their assessment of fu-
ture competitiveness: 85 p.c. believed to become competitive within a period of two years, half
of them even within one year. However, most of them were wrong: one year later, in summer
1992, more than 70 p.c. of firms initially or presently in the ownership of the Treuhandanstalt
classified themselves as not competitive, in summer 1991 the figure was 90 p.c. Many compa-
nies believed that it would be possible to stabilize exports to the former COMECON-countries
at a high level. They failed to turn around their exports from East to West or, as the conse-
quence of their low competitiveness on western markets, to cut down their production. Instead
of it they produced on stock - in the hope that the government would find a way to revitalize
east-exports.
The data from the 1992 poll show that the expectations of private or privatized firms were
somewhat more optimistic than those of Treuhand-firms (Table 2). The difference, however,
was lower than possibly expected: 83 p.c. of Treuhand-companies reported to be not competi-
tive, but also 67 p.c. of privatized companies initially in state ownership. A possible explana-
tion for this small difference may be that the figures collected from Treuhand-companies were
"overly optimistic while those from the privatized companies were very realistic. The prime
strategy of top managers in publicly owned enterprises is to keep their job as long as possible.
Consequently, their main interest is to make the Treuhandanstalt believe that successful re-
structuring is possible. In this context it is instructive that according to the projections the
Treuhandanstalt collected from her companies, sales in the first half of 1992 were planned to
increase by 20 p.c, while in fact sales decreased by more than 20 p.c.
It is not surprising that companies yet before 1990 in private ownership or founded after 1990
demonstrated a much better performance than companies just privatized: about 60 p.c. of them
considered themselves as fully competitive.11
Table 2 - Self-Assessment of Competitiveness by Eastern German Industrial Enterprises
in Summer 1991 and 1992
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Source: Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin.
a) Production and Turnover
A slight stabilization of turnover in the first half of 1992 - this was the major message of a poll
taken from 250 Eastern German industrial enterprises in February 1992 (Table 3): 41 p.c. of
companies expected increasing sales, 42 p.c. stagnating and only 17 p.c. decreasing sales. The
overwhelming majority failed to come up to these expectations: according to official statistics
sales decreased by about 17 p.c. in comparison to the second half year 1991. In face of these
facts the initially optimistic forecasts that recovery in the Eastern German industry would begin
to materialize in 1992 had to be revised considerably downwards.
The data grouping indicates that firms already privatized were significantly more optimistic in
their sales projections than those in the Treuhand-ownership. The share of firms expecting in-
creasing sales rose steadily among privatized firms while it dropped slightly among the Treu-
hand-firms from autumn 1991 to spring 1992. In fact, privatized firms were more successful in
sales promotion than Treuhand-firms. While privatized firms were able to stabilize turnover in
the first half year 1992, the Treuhand-firms suffered further from a significant decline. Cer-
tainly, for some part this result is due to biased selection - with an increase in the number of
privatized firms the future of the non-privatized firms is becoming worse on average. For an-
other and probably more important part, however, these figures seem to indicate that restructur-
ing of privatized firms is running much more successfully than restructuring of Treuhand-firms.12










































Source: Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Halle.
b) Market Shares
The Achilles heel of most Eastern German industrial companies is low product quality. All
companies have experienced a dramatic loss of market shares - both in export markets and in
domestic markets. The situation is changing very slowly. In summer 1992 merely one half of
the polled companies reported their market chances were beginning to improve (Table 4). How-
ever, while already 60 p.c. of privatized firms saw an increasing acceptance of their products
only 44 p.c. of Treuhand-firms shared this view. It is not clear whether privatized firms have
really been more successful in creating new or improved products. By all means, they have
benefited from using the purchaser's distribution network of their partners in Western Germany.
Table 4 - Acceptance of Eastern German Products 1992













Source: Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Halle.
It is no surprise that the polled privatized companies have been more successful in entering
"export markets" than the Treuhand-companies: their sales in Western Germany and foreignBibliofhek
des Instftufs fur Weltwirtschc
13
countries in comparison to total sales rose from 28 p.c. in 1989 to 48 p.c. in 1991 (Table 5).
The Treuhand-companies have been able to manage only a minor shift in their sales structure
(from 35 p.c. to 39 p.c).
Table 5 - Sales of Eastern German Industrial Enterprises in Western German and For-



















Source: Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Halle.
These findings are remarkable because many of already privatized companies are small and
medium sized ones which usually have advantages in supplying local markets. They are often
used as prolonged workbenches for domestic producers. Therefore, for the remaining Treu-
hand-companies export markets should be more important than home markets. However, these
companies suffer to a great extent from the breakdown of trade with their former partners in
Central and Eastern Europe. Treuhand-companies with strong performance in western export
markets are still an exception.
c) Profits
The dynamics of economic restructuring of Eastern German companies depend essentially on
their possibilities of closing the productivity gap under the conditions of rapid wage increase.
Although the companies have made some progress in cost cutting, according to the poll merely
22 p.c. of privatized firms and 10 p.c. of Treuhand-firms were making profits in spring 1992
(Table 6). Two thirds of all firms indicated that they expected to be back in the black until the
end of 1993. On average, the privatized firms will reach the profit zone one year earlier than the
Treuhand-firms.
Not all these hopes will come true. It is absolutely implausible that already in 1993 two thirds
of the Eastern German industrial firms will reach profitability and that more than 90 p.c. of14
them will reach profitability at all.
2 To a great extent the assessments expressed in the polls are
based on the optimistic expectation that it will be possible to stabilize the exports to the states
of the former Soviet Union. Such optimism is far from realistic. In recent months, trade with
these states has completely collapsed and there is no reason to believe that it will recover soon.
One should remember that one year ago 60 p.c. (!) of Eastern German industrial firms said in a
poll that they expected to operate in the black already in 1992.
Table 6 - Assessment of Eastern German Industrial Enterprises Reaching Profitability
... p.c. of enterprises operate or plan to op-
















Source: Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Halle,
A nearly unsolvable problem for Eastern German companies is the fast wage increase. They
will have to face a catch-up of tariff wages up to the Western German level by the end of 1994.
This means: wages will nearly double during the coming 2 1/2 years. On the other side, the
cost-cutting potential by raising productivity is - at least in the short run - limited: for the ma-
jority of firms it is impossible to compensate for yearly wage increases of more than 25 p.c.
Assessments concerning the ratio of productivity to wage increase made in spring 1992 indi-
cated that only 18 p.c. of firms were able to outstrip wage increases by equally large productiv-
ity increases (Table 7). 47 p.c. of Treuhand-firms and 29 p.c. of privatized firms failed to push
productivity strong enough to compensate for wage increases. Although a significant number of
firms reported that they had been able to close the gap in 1992, a hard core of firms has re-
mained in trouble.
2 Information from the Treuhandanstalt indicates that nearly none of her companies makes
profits. According to Treuhandanstalt calculations average losses in 1991 accounted for
48 p.c. of companies' total turnover: 40 p.c. of companies (which have been classified as
able to survive by means of their own efforts) reported losses of 15 p.c, 30 p.c. of
companies (which can only survive with the support of strong partners) reported losses of
5 p.c, and 30 p.c of companies (which have no realistic chance to survive) reported losses
of 90 p.c. in terms of turnover.15
Table 7 - Assessment of Productivity and Wage Increase by Eastern German Industrial
Enterprises
Productivity increase faster than wage
increase
Productivity increase equal to wage
increase





















Source: Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Halle.
3. Prospects
In summer 1991 31 p.c. of polled firms believed to have already passed their lowest point and
51 p.c. of firms expected to have passed it at the end of 1991 (Graph 3). This assessment has
proved to be far too optimistic. Latest statistical figures indicate a new setback in orders and










1st half 1991 2nd half 1991 1st half 1992 later
Source: Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Halle16
Regardless of this general error of judgement there were significant differences between the
privatized and Treuhand-firms. On average, privatized firms expected to pass their turning point
four to six months earlier than Treuhand-firms. This can also be seen as a clear sign for differ-
ent efforts in economic reorganization: while 76 p.c. of the privatized firms were convinced to
be running successfully, only 25 p.c. of Treuhand-firms expressed this view.
Clearly it is no surprise that an already privatized firm can be more optimistic about its pros-
pects than a firm still in Treuhandanstalt-ownership: the best firms will be transferred first from
state to private hands. But also a promising state-owned enterprise is facing an uncertain future
as long as it remains under the shelter of a state agency. Consequently, many companies lament
over the slow decision process in the Treuhand-bureaucracy. For example, 58 p.c. of the polled
firms reported troubles with the Treuhandanstalt - they doubted that she was running restructur-
ing successfully. A big problem for the firms is to get the agreement of the Treuhandanstalt to
their reorganization concepts. Without this agreement they have no access to bank credits and
thus they are unable to finance any investment. The Treuhandanstalt may have good reasons to
refuse its approval to the firm's restructuring concepts - many firms are hardly in circumstances
in which they can be restructured without further ado, and some firms cannot be restructured at
all. However, a company which is not able to invest is running unavoidably deeper into diffi-
culties.
Ill Adjustment Behaviour in Private and State-Owned Enterprises: The
Evaluation
Evidently, privatized firms provide much better preconditions for successful restructuring than
Treuhand-firms. They have - in contrast to many Treuhand-firms - a chance to become viable at
all, because
they have a convincing entrepreneurial concept;
they have access to funds for capital investment and
they have the possibility to establish a new promising management.
It is a speciality of the German model of privatization that the Treuhandanstalt does not sell any
enterprise unless these requirements are fulfilled (Hax 1992, Schatz 1992). As far as possible
the Treuhandanstalt takes into consideration not only the needs of the companies to be privat-
ized but also the wishes of private investors. She tailors the enterprises according to the inves-
tor's concept. Thus a privatized enterprise has better prospects for future success than enter-
prises remaining in Treuhand-ownership.17
1. Selected Adjustment Indicators
All Eastern German industrial companies have implemented various measures to stabilize or, if
possible, to even improve their economic situation. In the short term, however, the main objec-
tive of the management has been to secure the companies mere survival. Thus, adjustment be-
haviour has been dominated by defensive strategies. The most urgent task has been to cut costs
by reducing employment. Only gradually have companies started to implement offensive
strategies in order to improve their long-run prospects. According to two polls from summer
1991 and 1992 companies mainly have
set up or extended their activities on other regional markets,
changed their product assortment,
started the manufacture of new or considerably changed or improved products,
rationalized extensively (Table 8).
Although the strategic behaviour of privatized companies and Treuhand-companies mostly ex-
hibits strong similarities, striking differences are visible. In the latest poll
52 p.c. of privatized companies reported on extensive rationalizing while only 37 p.c. of
Treuhand-companies did so,
62 p.c. of privatized companies saw the necessity to modernize their equipment while
only 39 p.c. of the Treuhand-companies did so,
55 p.c. of the Treuhand-companies made efforts to splinter off parts of their activities
while out of privatized companies - which have been carefully tailored before the privati-
zation - only 35 p.c. did so.
The 1992 poll shows clearly that most of these measures are still of great importance for both
groups of companies - but compared with the previous year they seem to be more important for
Treuhand-companies than for privatized ones.18
Table 8 - Measures for Restructuring Implemented by Eastern German Enterprises in
Summer 1991 and 1992
Tightening of product assortment
Enlarging of product assortment
Reducing of manufacturing penetration





in western foreign countries
in eastern foreign countries
Increasing supply of pre-products by
non-Eastern-German companies
Manufacturing new or considerably
changed products
of which
based on their own research and devel-
opment or in cooperation with others
in licence production or off-shore pro-
duction
Extensive rationalizing
Splitting up of company units
Reorganizing of internal cost calculation
Investing in new equipment
Reducing employment
(a) Multiple entry allowed. Individual items
























































Source: Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin.
Investment
Capital investment is the most important vehicle in driving the process of restructuring. Nearly
all Eastern German companies have invested in both plant and equipment modernization - in
order to cut costs, to improve product quality and to strengthen their international competitive-
ness. Nevertheless, different patterns do appear: data grouping indicates that investment activi-
ties of privatized firms are much stronger than investment of Treuhand-firms (Table 9). In 1992
the level of realized and planned investment per employee is four times higher, and the share of
investment in turnover is twice as high for privatized as for Treuhand-firms. This can be19
interpreted as a further sign that privatized firms are focusing on long-term restructuring while
Treuhand-firms are predominantly short-term oriented and mainly invest in order to secure
survival. According to the latest poll privatized firms will invest 24 000 DM per employee in
1992, which is two thirds above the same ratio for firms in Western Germany (14 000 DM). In
contrast, investment per employee of Treuhand-firms will remain very low - on average
5 000 DM. Obviously, in many Treuhand-companies the management has lost courage and has
given up.

















4.7 9.5 11200 24100 30 40
9.0 28.5 8400 24900
2.5 3.4 13000 22100
7.2 6.5 3900 5800 10 20
18.6 15.4 4200 5000
0.8 1.4 3500 6500
Source: Instirut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Halle.
The poor investment activities of Treuhand-companies are also emanating from financing
problems. Since they are not able to obtain money from the capital markets they must operate
with money of the Treuhandanstalt (e.g. in form of allocating equity capital) or with short-term
bank credits (which must be backed by Treuhand-guarantees). In contrast to this privatized
firms have a much better access to sources of financing - not only to bank loans but also to
other funds as obtaining direct financing from western partners and from public investment
support programs (Table 10).
Table 10- Main Sources of Financing of Capital Investments of Eastern German Indus-
trial Enterprises in 1992 (p.c.)
Privatized Enterprises | Treuhand-Enterprises
Own financing
Credits
Financing by western partners
Financing by public promotion programs
Others











Source: Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Halle.20
Employment
An enterprise whose existence is at stake cannot avoid closing unprofitable lines of production
and reducing workforce. The Eastern German industrial companies have been heavily over-
staffed. Consequently, employment in the industrial sector has decreased dramatically - up to
now - down to 40 p.c. of its previous level.
Normally, for a privatized enterprise it is much easier to fire workers than for a public enter-
prise. The results of different polls indicate that Treuhand-companies have been able to delay
the process of reducing employment for some time. Now the situation has changed - a wave of
dismissals is under way: the Treuhand-firms have announced to reduce their workforce in 1992
by approximately one third, mostly in order to eliminate overemployment which so far has been
hidden by means of short-time work (Table 11). In this respect privatized companies are
strongly different from Treuhand-companies: they have obviously less need for further staff
cuts. But it should not be overlooked that privatized firms are generally in a better position
since an investor can press the Treuhandanstalt to reduce the workforce before changing owner-
ship - in the course of the privatization she runs down the number of employees by two-fifth on
average. Nevertheless, not all privatized firms are out of the wood. Some of them have difficul-
ties in stabilizing employment on the promised level.
Table 11- Planned Dismissals and Short-Time Work in Eastern Industrial Enterprises
1992 (in p.c. of Employed Persons)
Privatized enterprises
of which:
In ownership of Western Ger-


























Source: Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin.
Another big problem for the Treuhand-enterprises is not only sustaining labour surplus in gen-
eral but also growing shortage of specific kinds and qualifications. An enterprise in trouble is
mostly left by its most mobile and qualified workers. Treuhand-companies thus are suffering
more than privatized companies from negative selection. The only means to stop the exodus
would be paying competitive wages. However, Treuhand-companies are seldom in a position
which would allow to do this.21
2. Self-Assessment of Restructuring Strategies
It is no surprise that privatized companies and Treuhand-companies think differently about their
prospects: the first group is much more optimistic than the second one, and this is certainly jus-
tified. Privatized companies are in a better starting position than Treuhand-companies. Above
all, they have a convincing entrepreneurial concept and they have the opportunities to realize it.
Although the majority of the remaining companies has been classified by the Treuhandanstalt
as viable the management of these companies is doubtful about the efforts undertaken so far.
According to the 1992 poll only 25 p.c. of Treuhand-companies are convinced that their ad-
justment is running successfully, whereas 76 p.c. of privatized companies expressed this view
(Table 12).




Restructuring program is considered by ... p.c. as
successful partly successful not successful
76 10 14.
25 36 39
Source: Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Halle.
It has become evident that many companies under the charge of the Treuhandanstalt will never
become viable - except with heavy subsidies. A state agency with only 3 000 employees is
hardly able to restructure the presently remaining 4 000 companies. This is why the manage-
ment of these companies now finally favours rapid privatization, after refusing it for a long
time.
IV Privatization and Reorganization: The Conclusions
Although the paper suffers from a number of short-comings due to a poor database it provides
some evidence that a change in ownership - from public to private - is most important for creat-
ing significant improvements in the efficiencies of former socialist companies. It would be
quite wrong to ignore the findings which have been described.
The benefits of privatization are obvious: the company obtains a promising entrepreneurial con-
cept, fresh money for financing investment and a new management. It is not easy to decide
what is more important. The keystone for improving the company's performance is perhaps the
change in the management style (Bishop, Kay 1992). The former socialist managers have a
preference to emphasize more engineering than marketing and financing; they have always
maximized output instead of profit - and they have never learnt to think in terms of opportunity
costs. It is unlikely that they will be able to change their style by frustrating contacts with a22
sponsoring department of a state-owned agency. Consequently, the managers of many Treu-
hand-companies remain in a waiting position. They believe in the Treuhandanstalt's capability
to find either a private investor - or to hold out the company by providing liquidity. Through
this, necessary decisions concerning the company's future are delayed.
Certainly, privatization is not a panacea. The paper makes clear that under the special condi-
tions in Eastern Germany, where enterprises were suddenly exposed to competition without any
protection by trade barriers or an exchange rate, privatized firms are facing hard times as well as
firms under the charge of the Treuhandanstalt. However, there is strong evidence that the privat-
ized firms will cope with the problem much better than the Treuhand-firms.
The paper also underlines the merits of the German two-stage approach of privatization - first
tailoring and selling companies on the basis of individual negotiations and according to con-
cepts of potential investors, and second reorganization and restructuring under private owner-
ship. It is obviously the best way to make the formerly socialist companies fit for the market
economy, and in this respect superior to other forms of privatization favoured in Central and
Eastern European countries such as equity privatization, employee ownership or voucher pri-
vatization.23
Appendix
On the Ownership Structure in Eastern German Manufacturing
The ownership structure in Eastern German manufacturing is still a "black box". There is no
consistent data base which would allow correct calculations. In the following available data
from official statistics and from polls are mixed; missing data are estimated as far as possible.
The definition of "manufacturing" adopted here corresponds to the Statistisches Bundesamt's re-
porting practice.
3 Included are only enterprises with 20 and more employees. Excluded is - by
this limitation - the majority of firms of handicrafts. Insofar, the data refer by and large only to
enterprises which form the so-called "industrial sector".
The classification of ownership categories is normally done by differentiating between legal
owners. In Eastern Germany, however, there is a great number of enterprises with a mixed own-
ership - due to the fact that the Treuhandanstalt is privatizing not only complete enterprises but
often parts of them. Many of the enterprises classified to still be privatized are yet partly in pri-
vate hands. Through this the share of Treuhand-ownership may be somewhat higher than indi-
cated in the figures.
The used data apply to enterprises (Unternehmen) as legal units - not to local units (Betriebe).
An unknown number of local units in Eastern Germany is in the ownership of enterprises which
have their headquarters in Western Germany. By definition, they should be excluded from
reporting. However, it is not clear whether this problem has been handled sufficiently in the
different statistics.
Within the private sector a distinction is merely made between enterprises in the ownership of
Eastern German citizens and of Western German and foreign companies. No distinction is pos-
sible between those private enterprises which were either private before 1990 or were founded
after 1990 and those former state-own enterprises which have been privatized. The used poll da-
ta mostly refer to the second category, but in a few cases they included also the first one.
According to latest official statistics (July 1992) the number of enterprises (with 20 and more
employees) in Eastern German manufacturing was 5400 (Table Al).
4 From the polls one can
derive that 77 p.c. of them were in private ownership, 23 p.c. in Treuhand-ownership. However,
3 Statistik im Bergbau und im verarbeitenden Gewerbe.
4 The number of local units (Betriebe) was about 6200.24
these figures are partly misleading because private enterprises are on the average much smaller
than Treuhand-enterprises. In terms of employment the industrial sector is still dominated by
Treuhand-enterprises: their polled share was 67 p.c.
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Source: Statistisches Bundesamt; Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin; own cal-
culations.25
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